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ABSTRACT 
 
Prior research (Thomas, 1989; Das and Zhang, 2003; Jordan et al., 2008a) presents evidence that 
managers manipulate income to round up earnings per share (EPS) to key user reference points 
when unrounded EPS fall only slightly below these breakpoints.  In the U.S., studies on audit 
quality suggest that, relative to small audit firms, large CPA firms provide higher quality audits 
and, as such, more aggressively constrain their clients’ attempts to manage earnings in general 
(e.g., see Francis and Krishnan, 1999; Krishnan, 2003).  However, research outside the U.S. finds 
no consistent audit quality differential based on auditor size (e.g., see Piot and Janin, 2007; 
Maijoor and Vanstraelen, 2006).  The current study examines whether audit quality, as proxied by 
auditor size, in the U.S. constrains earnings management to effect user reference points in EPS.  
Using the Big 4 versus non-Big 4 dichotomy as the measure of auditor size and audit quality, 
results suggest that audit quality significantly restricts management’s attempts at rounding up 
EPS as clients of Big 4 firms show no major signs of this manipulative behavior while non-Big 4 
auditees appear to round up the first digital position right of the decimal point in EPS across zero 
to increase the digit immediately left of the decimal point by one. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
ealy and Wahlen (1999, p. 368) note that earnings management results from discretion in financial 
reporting with the intent of either misleading stakeholders about an entity’s performance or 
influencing contractual outcomes that are based on accounting numbers.  Earnings management can 
occur because accrual basis income depends on the use of estimates made in the financial reporting process.  For 
example, current earnings could be boosted by underestimating bad debts on credit sales or expected warranty costs 
on the goods sold (Huang et al., 2008).  In addition to using estimates to manipulate earnings, accounting method 
choices impact income with some procedures providing earnings-friendly effects (e.g., using FIFO inventory 
valuation rather than LIFO in the face of rising prices). 
 
 Income is often managed so that EPS figures reach desired levels.  For example, the literature shows that 
earnings are manipulated to insure that EPS meets analysts’ forecasts (e.g., see Payne and Robb, 2000; Jordan and 
Clark, 2003).  This is done because share price is affected by investors’ expectations concerning an entity’s future 
cash flow (i.e., dividend paying) prospects.  Since current EPS represents a signal of future cash flows, failing to 
meet analysts’ forecasts of EPS often results in a depressed share price while meeting these forecasts brings about a  
maintenance or growth in stock price. 
 
 Earnings are also managed to reach user reference points in EPS.  Here, the object of manipulation is not to 
meet analysts’ expectations of EPS but rather to achieve cognitive reference points such as zeros or fives in the two 
digital positions right of the decimal point (e.g., see Das and Zhang, 2003).  This type of earnings management 
H 
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occurs when unmanipulated EPS falls only slightly below the user reference points.  Discretionary accruals are used 
to increase income until EPS can be rounded up to these desired breakpoints.  Although this type of manipulation is 
often referred to as cosmetic earnings management (CEM), its results are anything but benign as Thomas (1989, p. 
774) notes that even “small changes in reported earnings [EPS] near user reference points have disproportionately 
large effects on perceived firm value.” 
 
 The primary purpose of a financial statement audit is to provide users assurance that the statements are 
prepared in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP).  A key concept within GAAP is that 
financial reporting should provide information that is representationally faithful (i.e., financial statements should 
correctly portray the information they purport to represent).  Earnings manipulation to achieve cognitive reference 
points in EPS seems to be in direct violation of the notion of representational faithfulness as the financial results are 
prepared not to reflect actual performance but rather to achieve predetermined outcomes.  It stands to reason, then, 
that audit quality should be inversely related to the incidence of this form of earnings management. 
 
 Significant research in the U.S. suggests that large audit firms provide higher quality audits than small 
firms (e.g., see DeAngelo, 1981; Francis and Krishnan, 1999; Geiger and Rama, 2006; Khurana and Raman, 2004).  
This is due in part to the superior training of personnel and greater industry expertise that presumably exist with 
large CPA firms along with a stronger desire to protect their reputations and avoid costly litigation from failed audits 
relative to small audit firms.  A specific stream of audit quality research in the U.S. further shows that, relative to 
small audit firms, large firms more aggressively constrain their clients’ discretionary accruals and, thus, their ability 
to manage earnings in general (e.g., see Becker et al., 1998; Francis et al., 1999). 
 
 To date, however, no specific research exists on the impact of audit quality (as represented by auditor size) 
on earnings manipulation to achieve user reference points in EPS.  The current study addresses this void in the 
literature by examining the incidence of this form of earnings management for a large sample of U.S. companies, 
first in whole and then segregated into two subsamples based on audit quality (i.e., auditor size measured as Big 4 
versus non-Big 4).   For the entire sample, clear signs of CEM appear in the EPS figures as unusually low 
frequencies of high numbers (i.e., eights and nines) and abnormally high rates of small numbers (i.e., zeros, ones, 
and twos) occur in the first digital position right of the decimal point in EPS.  This represents a classic pattern of 
earnings manipulation to round up this digital position so that the digit immediately left of the decimal point 
increases by one.  For the subsample of companies with non-Big 4 auditors, this same pattern of CEM in EPS 
emerges.  For the clients of Big 4 auditors, though, no significant signs of CEM appear in EPS, thus supporting 
earlier research findings that audit quality (i.e., auditor size) acts as a restraint on earnings management. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 Most of the literature on CEM deals with rounding earnings to reach cognitive reference points in income.   
Carslaw (1988) notes that humans attach the most emphasis to the first (i.e., left-most) digit within a number and 
increasingly less importance on the second, third, etc. digits.  In the number 3,927, three appears as the first digit 
with nine as the second digit and so on.  Brenner and Brenner (1982) indicate that humans possess only a limited 
amount of memory and, therefore, store only the most relevant information about a number in their minds.  Thus, 
investors would tend to remember primarily the most important digits within a number.  For example, Carslaw 
(1988) suggests that investors would remember $398 million in earnings by rounding it down to $390 million or 
perhaps even to $300 million.  Therefore, to prevent investors from rounding earnings down when unmanipulated 
income falls only slightly below user reference points, management will find ways to manipulate earnings to round 
it up to just across the breakpoint.  In the example above, management would round earnings up from $398 million 
to something slightly above $400 million. 
 
 Significant research across many time periods and countries shows that this form of CEM occurs with great 
regularity (e.g., see Carslaw, 1988; Thomas, 1989; Niskanen and Keloharju, 2000; Van Caneghem, 2002; Kinnunen 
and Koskela, 2003; Skousen et al., 2004; Jordan et al., 2008b).  All these studies examine the second earnings digit 
and indicate that this digital position contains abnormally lower rates of high numbers (e.g., eights and nines) and 
higher frequencies of small numbers (e.g., zeros and ones) than would be anticipated in unmanipulated earnings.  All 
other numbers appear in the second earnings position at rates approximating their expected frequencies.  From this 
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result, each researcher concludes similarly that when the second earnings digit falls just below zero, management 
rounds income up so that the second digit just reaches or crosses over zero.  The object of this manipulation is to 
increase the most important digit (i.e., the first digit) by one. 
 
 The studies referred to in the previous paragraph examine earnings management to achieve cognitive 
reference points in income, which is different than earnings management to reach user reference points in EPS.  That 
is, a company could not round up earnings to reach a user reference point in income while also doing so to reach a 
user reference point in EPS.  The two types of earnings manipulation are mutually exclusive for a given entity.  Only 
three studies examine earnings manipulation to achieve user reference points in EPS.  In the first of these, Thomas 
(1989) analyzes distributions of numbers in the right-most EPS digit (i.e., the digit two places right of the decimal 
point) for a large sample of U.S. companies.  He finds that for entities with positive earnings zeros and fives appear 
in this digital position far more often than expected.  The median deviation for zeros is as high as 36 percent of the 
expected frequency and nearly 16 percent for fives.  No unusual patterns occur in the digital frequencies for 
companies with negative income.  From these results, Thomas (1989) surmises that the right-most digit is used as a 
reference point for EPS numbers.  For an explanation of why zeros and fives appear in this position at unusually 
high rates, he proffers the $1.99 pricing phenomenon as a possible reason.  That is, consumers view a price of $2.00 
as substantially higher than a price of $1.99.  Extending this to financial reporting, investors would likely perceive 
an EPS of $.20 as much higher than $.19.  Thus, when unmanipulated EPS falls only slightly below a user reference 
point (i.e., a zero or five in the right digit), management finds ways to round earnings up until the user reference 
point in EPS is achieved. 
 
 Das and Zhang (2003) extend Thomas’s (1989) work by examining the digital frequencies appearing in the 
position immediately right of the decimal point in the EPS numbers for a sample of U.S. companies.  For entities 
with positive income, they find that the frequency of numbers appearing in this digital position steadily decreases 
from the number one to the number four but then abruptly increases at the point of five.  This discontinuity at the 
point of five is statistically significant.  For the numbers five through zero (i.e., five, six, seven, eight, nine, and 
zero) the frequencies remain relatively stable.  Das and Zhang (2003, p. 40) conclude that their “evidence is 
consistent with managers manipulating earnings upward to round-up reported EPS.”  They further surmise that 
managers are more motivated to manipulate earnings to round up EPS when unmanipulated EPS numbers are close 
to behavioral benchmarks.  Finally, Das and Zhang (2003) present evidence that managers accomplish the earnings 
manipulation needed to round up EPS via short-term accruals. 
 
 Jordan et al. (2008a) extend the work of Thomas (1989) and Das and Zhang (2003) by examining whether 
the propensity to engage in CEM with respect to EPS is related to specific company characteristics (i.e., entity size, 
operating performance, and debt leverage).  Analyzing a sample of U.S. companies, like Thomas (1989) they test for 
unusual digital patterns in the right-most position of EPS.  However, contrary to Thomas (1989) who finds 
abnormally high distributions of fives and zeros in this position for companies with positive earnings, Jordan et al. 
(2008a) discover no unusual digital patterns for their full sample of entities.  When their sample is segregated by 
company characteristics, though, unusual digital patterns and signs of earnings manipulation emerge.  The strongest 
signs occur when company size is examined but with the subgroups of large and small entities exhibiting different 
patterns of EPS manipulation.  
 
 The small entities possess significantly more zeros than expected in the right EPS position, which is 
consistent with the $1.99 pricing phenomenon.  The large companies, though, report significantly higher frequencies 
of sixes and lower rates of ones than expected in this position.  Jordan et al. (2008a) note that the reasons for these 
unusual patterns for the large entities are unknown, but they are intuitive.  The number one is the smallest non-zero 
number and management would likely prefer not to have this number in the right-most EPS position.  This would be 
especially true if EPS is relatively low.  “For example, an EPS of $.02 is much larger and more desirable than an 
EPS of $.01 (Jordan et al., 2008a, p. 37).”  The researchers note that the higher than expected rate of sixes could be 
occurring simply because management seeks to get the right EPS digit into the upper half of the digital range. 
 
 All three of the above studies examining digital patterns in EPS provide evidence of CEM in relation to 
EPS.  More specifically, the research suggests that earnings are managed so that EPS can be rounded up to desirable 
reference points.  The next section of the literature review examines studies dealing with audit quality and its effect 
on earnings management in general. 
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 Craswell et al. (1995) note that Big N (i.e., 8/7/6/5/4) auditors may be able to provide higher quality audits 
than non-Big N auditors because the former group devotes more resources to staff training and developing industry 
expertise relative to non-Big N firms.  Krishnan (2003) posits that because of their size Big N auditors are in a better 
position, relative to non-Big N auditors, to question or negotiate with clients who attempt to adopt aggressive 
accounting procedures.  That is, relative to non-Big N auditors, Big N firms can more easily absorb the financial loss 
associated with losing an individual client, which gives them greater independence.  Blokdijk et al. (2006) find that 
an audit quality differential exists for Big N auditors compared to non-Big N auditors not because of the time 
involved in an engagement but because of differences in audit technologies and how the audits are conducted. 
 
There also exists a belief that Big N auditors provide higher quality audits than non-Big N firms because 
Big N auditors have larger client bases and, therefore, have more to lose in the event of loss of reputation that would 
be associated with a poorly performed audit (e.g., see Becker et al., 1998).  Finally, a significant stream of research 
suggests that Big N auditors provide higher quality audits relative to non-Big N firms to minimize the litigation risks 
or costs accompanying a failed audit (e.g., see DeAngelo, 1981; Simunic and Stein, 1996; Khurana and Raman, 
2004; Geiger and Rama, 2006).  Because of the large audit firms’ “deep pockets” and, thus, their huge exposure to 
litigation risks, these firms may take more conservative approaches to dealing with their clients’ questionable 
transactions than would small audit firms. 
 
Becker et al. (1998) suggest that the effectiveness of an audit in constraining earnings management varies 
directly with the quality of the audit.  For the many reasons noted above, there is a presumption in the literature that, 
relative to non-Big N auditors, Big N auditors provide higher quality audits.  As such, research examining the 
relationship between audit quality and earnings management typically uses auditor size and specifically the Big N 
versus non-Big N dichotomy as the surrogate measure for audit quality.  For these studies conducted in the U.S., the 
evidence consistently supports the notion that, relative to non-Big N firms, Big N auditors more aggressively 
constrain their clients’ discretionary accruals and, thus, their ability to manage earnings (e.g., see Becker et al., 
1998; Francis et al., 1999; Francis and Krishnan, 1999; Krishnan, 2003). 
 
Outside the U.S., though, studies generally provide little or no evidence of an audit quality (i.e., auditor 
size) differential in terms of constraining earnings management (e.g., see Vander Bauwhede and Willekens, 2004; 
Van Caneghem, 2004; Maijoor and Vanstraelen, 2006; Piot and Janin, 2007).  Instead, the quality of an audit in non-
U.S. countries seems to be a function of the national audit environment.  Companies operating in countries with 
strict audit environments and strong investor protection schemes engage in less earnings management than entities in 
countries with flexible audit environments and weak investor protection schemes (e.g., see Maijoor and Vanstraelen, 
2006; Francis and Wang, 2008).  The U.S. has a stricter audit environment and more investor-friendly legal system 
than exist in most other nations, and this is likely the reason an audit quality differential based on auditor size occurs 
in the U.S. but not necessarily in other countries (Khurana and Raman, 2004; Piot and Janin, 2007).  That is, in the 
U.S. Big N auditors provide higher quality audits relative to non-Big N firms to lessen their exposure to litigation 
risks. 
 
The above studies present evidence that audit quality, as represented by auditor size, constrains earnings 
management in general in the U.S. but not necessarily outside the U.S.  However, no prior research examines the 
effect of audit quality (i.e., auditor size) on the specific practice of managing earnings to reach desired reference 
points in EPS.  For a sample of U.S. companies, the current study seeks to determine if audit quality constrains this 
particular form of earnings manipulation. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
 As noted previously, research shows that auditor size proxies for audit quality with larger audit firms 
providing higher quality audits relative to smaller CPA firms (e.g., see DeAngelo, 1981; Khurana and Raman, 
2004).  The natural delineation for auditor size and the one used in prior studies on audit quality as a constraining 
factor on earnings management is the dichotomy of Big 4 versus non-Big 4 auditors.  There is some question, 
however, concerning how to categorize mid-tier audit firms such as BDO Seidman, Grant Thornton, and McGladrey 
Pullen that possess characteristics of both Big 4 and non-Big 4 auditors.  In examining going-concern reporting 
quality, Geiger and Rama (2006) discover a significant difference between Big 4 and non-Big 4 auditors but find no 
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significant difference between mid-tier audit firms and lower-tier (i.e., regional/local) firms.  For these reasons, the 
current study adopts the traditional Big 4 versus non-Big 4 classification as the measure of auditor size and, thus, the 
proxy for audit quality. 
 
 Prior research also shows that audit quality (i.e., auditor size) acts as a constraint on earnings management 
in general in the U.S. but not necessarily outside the U.S. (e.g., see Francis and Krishnan, 1999; Maijoor and 
Vanstraelen, 2006).  Thus, to ascertain whether audit quality restricts earnings manipulation to achieve user 
reference points in EPS, the current research examines U.S. companies only.  The sample companies are selected 
from those whose shares are traded on the NASDAQ, AMEX, and OTC exchanges.  Entities listed on these 
exchanges provide a healthy mix of companies audited by Big 4 and non-Big 4 auditors.  Because previous research 
(Thomas, 1989) demonstrates that CEM with respect to EPS is more likely to occur with entities generating positive 
income than with those reporting net losses, only companies with positive earnings are included in the sample.  
Select 2007 financial statement data are obtained from the Lexis Nexis Business database.  The sample of 
companies contains all U.S. entities with positive 2007 income that are listed on one of the three exchanges noted 
above and are also included in the Lexis Nexis Business database.  Using these selection parameters results in a total 
sample size of 1,251 companies with 631 and 620 of these audited by Big 4 and non-Big 4 audit firms, respectively. 
 
 Previous studies on earnings management to achieve user reference points in EPS concentrate on digital 
analysis of either the first or second digit right of the decimal point in basic EPS from continuing operations.  The 
notion is that, generally, earnings manipulation can provide for the rounding up of EPS by only a few cents.    Das 
and Zhang (2003) test for CEM in EPS by examining the first digit right of the decimal point, while Thomas (1989) 
and Jordan et al. (2008a) analyze the second digit right of the decimal point.  The current study examines both the 
first and second digits right of the decimal point for signs of unusual patterns suggesting earnings rounding near user 
reference points. 
 
 Studies testing for CEM do so by comparing the actual frequencies of numbers (i.e., zero through nine) 
appearing in key digital positions with the expected frequencies of those numbers assuming no manipulative 
behavior.  For example, Thomas (1989) shows that zeros and fives appear in the right-most EPS position far more 
often than anticipated, thus suggesting that earnings are manipulated so that the right EPS digit can be rounded up to 
these user reference points.  A crucial issue for this study, then, is correctly identifying the appropriate expected 
frequency at which each number (i.e., zero through nine) should appear in the two digital positions right of the 
decimal point in EPS.  Studies on CEM in relation to net income (e.g., see Van Caneghem, 2002; Skousen et al., 
2004) use the expected frequencies as postulated by Benford (1938), who shows that for naturally occurring 
numbers the digits one through nine do not possess an equal likelihood of appearing in the first (i.e., left-most) 
digital position.  Similarly, the numbers zero through nine do not occur in the second digital position in equal 
proportions.  Instead, low numbers appear in these two digital positions more often than high numbers.  For 
example, the first digital position within a naturally occurring number possesses a 30.10 percent chance of being a 
one and only a 4.60 percent likelihood of being a nine.  For digital positions right of the second digit, though, each 
number (zero through nine) has an approximately equal chance of occurring. 
 
 However, Benford’s expected frequencies do not apply to EPS numbers because EPS is a ratio rather than a 
naturally occurring number.  In their studies examining digital patterns in EPS numbers, Das and Zhang (2003) and 
Jordan et al. (2008a) assume there is no a priori reason to believe the frequencies of numbers appearing in EPS 
positions right of the decimal point should be anything other than proportional.  That is, each number from zero 
through nine possesses a 10 percent chance of appearing in these two digital positions.  The current study uses these 
same expected proportions. 
 
 To test for unusual digital patterns in EPS, the actual frequency of each number (zero through nine) 
appearing in the positions right of the decimal point is compared to its expected frequency (i.e., 10 percent).  Simple 
proportions tests and “Z” values are used to ascertain the statistical significance of the differences between the 
observed and expected frequencies.  Anomalies occurring in digital frequencies near user reference points (e.g., 
zeros or fives) suggest earnings manipulation consistent with CEM of EPS.  The tests are first conducted on the full 
sample of 1,251 companies to ascertain whether earnings appear to be manipulated to achieve user reference points 
in EPS in general.  Then, the full sample is segregated into two subsamples based on auditor size (i.e., Big 4 versus 
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non-Big 4) and the tests for CEM in EPS are performed for each subsample to determine if audit quality, as proxied 
by auditor size, affects the propensity to manage earnings to effect user reference points in EPS. 
 
RESULTS 
 
 No unusual digital patterns exist in the position two places right of the decimal point in EPS to suggest 
earnings manipulation to achieve user reference points.  More specifically, the observed frequencies of numbers 
immediately adjacent to the user reference points of zero and five (and including zero and five) conform to their 
expected frequencies.  For example, for the full sample, the observed frequencies of zeros and fives in the right-most 
EPS position are 9.11 percent and 8.95 percent, respectively.  The expected frequency is, of course, 10 percent for 
each number.  The p-levels for the differences between the observed and expected frequencies for zeros and fives in 
the right-most EPS position are .296 and .217, respectively.  Using a .01 alpha level leads to the conclusion that 
zeros and fives appear in this digital position at rates approximating their anticipated frequencies.  If earnings are 
manipulated to achieve user reference points in the right-most EPS position, there should exists a significantly larger 
than expected occurrence of either zeros or fives (or both) in this position.  However, this does not happen, which 
suggests there is no manipulation to achieve user reference points in the right-most EPS digit.  The same findings 
hold true for the two subsamples separated by auditor size. 
 
 These results differ substantially from those of Thomas (1989) who finds evidence of earnings 
manipulation with significantly more zeros and fives than expected in the right-most EPS position.  However, the 
results confirm the findings of Jordan et al. (2008a) where no unusual digital patterns occur in the right-most EPS 
position for their full sample of companies.  This discrepancy in findings could be occurring because of the different 
time periods under study.  Although all three studies examine U.S. companies, they do so in markedly different 
years.  Thomas (1989) analyzes 1986 data, while Jordan et al. (2008a) examine 2006 data.  Jordan et al. (2008a) 
posit that a possible explanation for the discrepancies in the findings is that the more recent data may have been 
affected by the heightened awareness and scrutiny of earnings management by the SEC and Congress following the 
egregious financial statement manipulations occurring in the recent past (e.g., Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, etc.).  To 
avoid the stiff penalties now in place through the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, managers in 2006 may have been less prone 
to manipulate earnings relative to managers in 1986. 
 
 Whether this is the true reason for the difference between the findings of Thomas (1989) and Jordan et al. 
(2008a) is unknown.  However, the results of the present research (which is based on 2007 data) provide additional 
support for the Jordan et al. (2008a) findings that, overall, management does not now appear to be manipulating 
earnings to achieve user points in the right-most EPS digit.  This does not necessarily mean that earnings are not 
being managed to reach user reference points in EPS but only that the right-most position does not appear to be the 
object of any such manipulation. 
 
 Indeed, when examining the observed frequencies of numbers appearing in the digital position immediately 
right of the decimal point in EPS, strong signs of earnings manipulation emerge.  For the full sample of 1,251 
companies, Table 1 presents the observed counts and frequencies for each of the numbers zero through nine 
occurring in the digital position immediately right of the decimal point, hereafter referred to as the first decimal 
position (FDP).  The table also shows the “Z” values and p-levels for a one-sample proportions test for the 
difference between the observed frequency of each number (zero through nine) appearing in the FDP and its 
expected frequency of 10 percent.  Earnings manipulation to effect CEM in EPS would be suggested if unusual 
digital patterns occur in numbers adjacent to and including the user reference points of zero and five in the FDP. 
 
Earnings management to achieve a user reference point of five in the FDP would be indicated by a 
significantly larger number of fives and an abnormally smaller number of threes and/or fours than expected in this 
position.  However, using a .01 alpha level reveals no unusual digital patterns occur at or around the user reference 
point of five in the FDP.  For example, Table 1 shows that the number five appears in the FDP 118 times, which is 
9.4 percent of the total 1,251 observations.  The “Z” value and p-level for the difference between this observed 
frequency and the expected frequency of 10 percent are -.67 and .50, respectively.  Similar results occur for the 
numbers three and four in the FDP (i.e., their observed frequencies conform to their expected frequencies).  This 
suggests earnings are not manipulated to achieve a user reference point of five in the FDP of EPS.  
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Table 1 
Digital Frequencies for FDP in EPS for Full Sample 
      Number appearing in FDP of EPS                     
   0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
Observed count (n) 185 158 157 134 115 118 106 103 81 94 
Observed frequency (%) 14.8 12.6 12.5 10.7 9.2 9.4 8.5 8.2 6.5 7.5 
Expected frequency (%) 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 
Z value   5.65 3.10 3.01 0.84 -0.95 -0.67 -1.80 -2.08 -4.16 -2.93 
p-level   .00 .00 .00 .40 .34 .50 .07 .04 .00 .00 
 
Note: Z values and p-levels are for a one-sample proportions test comparing the observed frequency of a number to the expected 
frequency of 10%. 
 
 
Instead, a pattern of earnings manipulation seems to occur with the object being the rounding of the FDP in 
EPS to or across zero.  In particular, the two highest numbers (i.e., eight and nine) appear in the FDP much less 
often than anticipated with p-levels indicating that the differences between their observed and expected frequencies 
are statistically significant (i.e., p-levels of .00 for both eight and nine).  Conversely, the three lowest numbers (i.e., 
zero, one, and two) occur in the FDP significantly more often than expected with p-levels for the differences 
between their observed and expected frequencies of .00 for each of them.  The middle-range numbers, three through 
seven, appear in the FDP at rates approximating their expected frequencies (i.e., all of them possess p-levels 
exceeding the .01 alpha level). 
 
The digital patterns for the FDP indicate a clear form of earnings manipulation to round up the FDP in EPS 
to increase the first position left of the decimal point by one.  That is, when the FDP is high (i.e., an eight or nine), 
management apparently manipulates earnings to round up EPS until the FDP reaches or crosses zero, thereby 
increasing the first digit left of the decimal point by one.  This represents a classic pattern of earnings rounding to 
increase the most important digit in a number (i.e., the left-most digit) by one.  The vast majority of EPS numbers 
have only one digit left of the decimal point (i.e., very few companies possess EPS of $10 or higher).  Thus, 
rounding up the FDP to or across zero increases the most important digit (i.e., the dollar digit) by one. 
 
Such earnings rounding to effect an increase in the left-most EPS digit by one has not been previously 
documented in CEM studies.  Yet, this form of CEM is firmly founded in the $1.99 pricing phenomenon posited by 
many (e.g., see Carslaw, 1988; Thomas, 1989) as a primary reason for earnings management to achieve cognitive 
reference points in earnings or EPS.  As noted earlier, when rounding numbers, humans (i.e., investors) typically 
round down rather than up.  Thus, when unmanipulated EPS falls just below a user reference point (e.g., $1.96), 
rather than allowing investors to round this EPS figure down managers may instead manipulate earnings upward 
until EPS crosses the breakpoint (i.e., goes above $2.00).  The incentive for this earnings rounding is, of course, as 
Thomas (1989) notes that even small changes in earnings or EPS near user reference points can produce large 
effects on company value.    
 
 In addition to the digital patterns of the FDP in EPS shown in Table 1 suggesting classic signs of earnings 
rounding to achieve cognitive reference points in EPS, they also indicate aggressive manipulative behavior.  With 
conservative manipulation to increase the first digit left of the decimal point by one, there should exist a lower 
frequency of nines and higher rate of zeros than expected in the FDP.  That is, the rounding up would be over a 
relatively narrow range of the FDP.  However, the rounding actually appears over a much wider range than merely 
from nines to zeros.  Instead, rounding occurs in the FDP all the way from eights and nines to zeros, ones, and twos. 
 
 These results are similar to those of Niskanen and Keloharju (2000) who examine earnings rounding for a 
group of Finnish companies.  In examining the second digital position in income, they find significantly lower 
frequencies of sixes and sevens and higher rates of zeros and ones than expected.  This leads them to conclude that 
managers of Finnish entities practice aggressive manipulation by rounding up the second earnings digit over a wide 
range to increase the first digit by one.  Previous studies on CEM at that time (i.e., Carslaw, 1988; Thomas, 1989) 
had shown that the rounding up of earnings was limited to cases where the second digit was very high (i.e., a nine) 
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and then was rounded up just to the breakpoint (i.e., zero).  Niskanen and Keloharju (2000) suggest that the earnings 
manipulation by Finnish managers to achieve user reference points in income is more than merely cosmetic.  This 
same type of aggressive manipulative behavior appears to be occurring in the U.S. relative to achieving user 
reference points in the digital position in EPS immediately left of the decimal point. 
 
 When the full sample is separated according to audit quality (i.e., auditor size), interesting results appear in 
relation to rounding of the FDP in EPS.  For the subsample of 620 companies audited by non-Big 4 firms, Table 2 
provides the observed and expected frequencies for the numbers zero through nine occurring in the FDP.  Also 
reported are the “Z” value and p-level for a proportions test for the difference between the observed and expected 
frequency for each of these numbers. 
 
Table 2 
Digital Frequencies for FDP in EPS for Non-Big 4 Clients 
      Number appearing in FDP of EPS                     
   0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
Observed count (n) 109 85 81 62 55 47 51 53 35 42 
Observed frequency (%) 17.6 13.7 13.1 10.0 8.9 7.6 8.2 8.6 5.7 6.8 
Expected frequency (%) 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 
Z value   6.29 3.08 2.54 0 -0.94 -2.01 -1.47 -1.20 -3.61 -2.68 
p-level   .00 .00 .01 1.0 .35 .05 .14 .23 .00 .01 
 
Note: Z values and p-levels are for a one-sample proportions test comparing the observed frequency of a number to the expected 
frequency of 10%. 
 
 Notice that the results for the 620 companies audited by non-Big 4 firms echo those of the full sample in 
Table 1.  Significantly fewer eights and nines and more zeros, ones, and twos than anticipated appear in the FDP of 
EPS (i.e., the p-level for each of these is .01 or lower).  It seems non-Big 4 auditees engage in earnings management 
to round up the FDP in EPS across the breakpoint when the unmanipulated FDP falls within a couple of digits below 
that point.  Such upward rounding of the FDP likely occurs to increase the digital position immediately left of the 
decimal point (i.e., the dollar digit) by one.  Again, like the full sample, this manipulation appears aggressive as the 
range of rounding the FDP for the non-Big 4 auditess is more than merely from nines to zeros. 
 
 Table 3 presents the results for the 631 Big 4 auditees.  The digital patterns for the FDP in EPS for these 
companies differ markedly from those of both the full sample and the subsample of Big 4 auditees presented in 
Tables 1 and 2, respectively.  Some signs of earnings manipulation to effect CEM in EPS appear for the Big 4 
auditees as Table 3 shows a lower than expected frequency occurs for each of the four highest numbers (i.e., six, 
seven, eight, and nine) in the FDP.  Conversely, the four lowest numbers (i.e., zero, one, two, and three) appear in 
the FDP more often than anticipated.  This digital pattern suggests than when the FDP in EPS is a high number, 
earnings are managed upward until the FDP crosses zero.  This results in the first digit left of the decimal point 
increasing by one, which would be the real purpose of the manipulation. 
 
Table 3 
Digital Frequencies for FDP in EPS for Big 4 Clients 
      Number appearing in FDP of EPS      
   0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
Observed count (n) 76 73 76 72 60 71 55 50 46 52 
Observed frequency (%) 12.0 11.6 12.0 11.4 9.5 11.3 8.7 7.9 7.3 8.2 
Expected frequency (%) 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 
Z value   1.71 1.31 1.71 1.18 -0.41 1.05 -1.07 -1.74 -2.27 -1.47 
p-level   .09 .19 .09 .24 .68 .29 .28 .08 .02 .14 
 
Note: Z values and p-levels are for a one-sample proportions test comparing the observed frequency of a number to the expected 
frequency of 10%. 
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 However, the proportions tests shown in Table 3 reveal that none of the observed and expected frequencies 
differ at a statistically significant level (i.e., each one possesses a p-level greater than the alpha level of .01).  This 
suggests that any manipulation that might be occurring within the subsample of Big 4 auditees cannot be definitively 
proven as the anomalies noted in the digital patterns of the FDP in Table 3 may simply be due to random chance.  
Stated differently, it appears that Big 4 auditors constrain their clients’ efforts to manipulate earnings to reach user 
reference points in EPS more aggressively than non-Big 4 auditors.  Thus, using auditor size as a proxy for audit 
quality as suggested in prior research, these results indicate that audit quality restrains the practice of CEM in 
relation to EPS. 
 
 There is, of course, a possibility that the differences noted above in the propensity to engage in CEM 
relative to EPS may be impacted by factors other than audit quality (i.e., auditor size).  Perhaps the clients of non-
Big 4 auditors simply possess certain characteristics that make them more prone to earnings management than the 
clients of Big 4 auditors.  For example, Jordan et al. (2008b) demonstrate that small companies practice CEM with 
respect to income more aggressively than large companies.  Similarly, less profitable entities engage in this activity 
with greater intensity than more profitable ones (Jordan et al., 2008b). 
 
 If the clients of Big 4 versus non-Big 4 auditors differ only with respect to the size classification of their 
auditors, then clear evidence exists that it is the audit quality (i.e., auditor size) factor driving the results in Tables 2 
and 3.  However, if the subsamples of Big 4 and non-Big 4 auditees differ along traits other than auditor size, the 
relationship between audit quality, as proxied by auditor size, and the propensity to engage in CEM relative to EPS 
becomes a little more tenuous.  Table 4 presents summary measures (i.e., medians) for the subsamples of Big 4 and 
non-Big 4 auditees along three financial traits (size as measured by total assets, profitability as represented by return 
on investment, and leverage as measured by the percentage of debt to total assets). 
 
 
Table 4 
Summary Measures of Financial Traits of Big 4 and Non-Big 4 Clients 
    Median total  Median return  Median debt 
    assets (000s)  on investment  to total assets 
Big 4 clients (n=631)  $708,588          4.92%       47.56% 
 
Non-Big 4 clients (n=620)    264,618          1.88         75.18 
 
p-level          .00           .00            .00 
Note: p-level is for a one-sample median test comparing amounts for the Big 4 clients to the median for the non-Big 4 clients. 
 
 
 On each of the financial traits measured, the group of non-Big 4 clients differs significantly from the group 
of Big 4 auditees.  For example, the median total assets of the Big 4 auditees is almost $709 million compared to 
only about $265 million for the non-Big 4 clients.  Relative to the Big 4 auditees, non-Big 4 clients are significantly 
smaller, less profitable, and more heavily burdened with debt.  It is possible that these traits make the non-Big 4 
auditees more prone to earnings management than the clients of Big 4 auditors.  As an example, intuitively, less 
profitable companies would seem to have more need to manage EPS upward to key reference points than would 
more profitable entities.  Similarly, heavily debt ladened companies may be perceived as riskier investments than 
ones with lower debt levels; thus, the former group may be more inclined to round up EPS to key reference points to 
make their stock more attractive to investors than would entities less burdened with debt. 
 
 The information in Table 4 suggests that companies possessing the financial traits associated with more 
need to manage EPS hire non-Big 4 auditors while entities with less need to manipulate EPS engage Big 4 auditors.  
Thus, it is conceivable that audit quality (i.e., auditor size) produces little or no affect on the propensity to manage 
earnings to reach user reference points in EPS but instead Big 4 auditors just happen to audit entities with little need 
or desire to manipulate EPS while non-Big 4 auditors have the unfortunate luck of auditing clients with a stronger 
need to manipulate EPS.  A more likely scenario, though, is that companies desiring to manipulate income and EPS 
seek out auditors less likely to challenge their questionable accounting procedures.  In essence, it is probably the 
audit quality (i.e., auditor size) factor that drives the auditor selection process and, as such, audit quality would seem 
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to produce a major impact on the propensity to manipulate earnings to achieve desired reference points in EPS. 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
 Prior studies (i.e., Thomas, 1989; Das and Zhang, 2003; Jordan et al., 2008a) present evidence that 
managers manipulate income in order to round up EPS to key user reference points, such as zeros or fives in the two 
digital positions right of the decimal point.  Rounding EPS to these benchmark figures can produce significant 
effects on company value.  Research on audit quality in the U.S. suggests that large audit firms provide higher 
quality audits than small firms and, as such, are better able to constrain their clients’ attempts at earnings 
management in general than are small firms (e.g., see Francis et al., 1999; Krishnan, 2003).  Outside the U.S., 
though, studies provide mixed results and often find no audit quality differential between large and small audit firms 
in terms of restricting earnings management (e.g., see Van Caneghem, 2004; Piot and Janin, 2007).  It is speculated 
that an audit quality differential based on auditor size occurs in the U.S. but not consistently in other countries 
because of the greater litigation risks and more strict audit environment that exist in the U.S. relative to other 
countries.  Because of their “deep pockets” and great exposure from litigation associated with a failed audit, large 
audit firms in the U.S. are more likely to take staunch stands against their clients’ questionable accounting 
procedures than are small audit firms. 
 
 For a sample of U.S. companies, the current research attempts to ascertain whether audit quality, as proxied 
by auditor size, constrains one particular type of earnings management (i.e., earnings manipulation to achieve 
cognitive reference points in EPS).  For the full sample of companies not delineated by audit quality (i.e., auditor 
size), a clear pattern of earnings manipulation with respect to EPS emerges as significantly fewer eights and nines 
and more zeros, ones, and twos than expected appear in the first digital position right of the decimal point.  This 
suggests that when this digital position is a high number, earnings are managed upward to increase EPS until this 
digit reaches or crosses zero, thus resulting in the digit immediately left of the decimal point (i.e., the dollar position) 
increasing by one. 
 
 The full sample is then segregated into two subsamples using the dichotomy of Big 4 versus non-Big 4 
auditor as the measure of auditor size and, thus, audit quality.  For the subsample of non-Big 4 auditees, the same 
digital patterns appear in the first position right of the decimal point in EPS as occur for the full sample.  This 
indicates that managers of companies audited by small audit firms manipulate earnings to round up EPS to user 
reference points.  For the subsample of Big 4 auditees, though, no statistically significant differences occur between 
the observed and expected frequencies of the numbers one through nine appearing in the first digital position right of 
the decimal point, thus suggesting that the clients of large CPA firms do not manipulate earnings to achieve user 
reference points in EPS.  Although it is possible the clients of Big 4 firms simply have less desire to manipulate EPS 
figures relative to the non-Big 4 auditees, a more probable explanation for the findings noted above is that large 
audit firms do a better job of constraining their clients’ efforts at manipulating earnings and EPS than do small audit 
firms. 
 
SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
 Previous research suggests that audit quality (i.e., auditor size) impacts the incidence of earnings 
management in general in the U.S. but not necessarily in other countries.  For this reason, the current study examines 
only U.S. companies to ascertain whether audit quality constrains CEM in relation to EPS; results indicate that it 
does.  Future research could replicate the present study in non-U.S. countries to determine if these findings are 
isolated to the U.S. 
 
 When examining the subsamples of Big 4 and non-Big 4 auditees, the present research discovers that these 
two groups possess markedly different financial traits.  That is, relative to the Big 4 clients, the non-Big 4 auditees 
are on average significantly smaller, less profitable, and more heavily debt ladened.  Future research could provide 
more definitive evidence on whether audit quality (i.e., auditor size) impacts the incidence of CEM relative to EPS 
by reducing the potential noise that exists in the current study from the different financial characteristics associated 
with the subsamples of Big 4 and non-Big 4 auditees.  For example, the present study could be replicated using a 
sample of companies that do not differ significantly in terms of size.  If similar results to those obtained in the 
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current study occur, stronger evidence exists that audit quality, rather than client characteristics, impacts the 
likelihood that managers manipulate earnings to achieve user reference points in EPS. 
 
AUTHOR INFORMATION 
 
Charles E. Jordan, CPA, DBA, is a professor in the School of Accounting at the University of Southern 
Mississippi.  His primary teaching and research areas are financial reporting.  Dr. Jordan has on multiple occasions 
received the annual BellSouth Outstanding Faculty in the College of Business at the University of Southern 
Mississippi and was awarded the 2007-2008 Innovation in Applied Research Award for the university. He has 
published numerous articles in professional and academic journals, including Business Ethics Quarterly, 
Transportation Journal, Journal of Applied Business Research, Journal of Accountancy, and The CPA Journal. 
 
Stanley J. Clark, CPA, Ph.D., is a Professor in the School of Accounting at the University of Southern Mississippi.  
His primary teaching areas are financial and tax accounting.  His research has primarily focused on financial 
accounting and reporting issues.  He is active professionally serving as discussion leader for numerous continuing 
education programs for local CPAs.  He has published articles in several journals, including the Journal of Business 
and Economic Perspectives, Academy of Accounting and Financial Studies Journal, and Oil, Gas & Energy 
Quarterly. 
 
Charlotte C. Hames holds undergraduate degrees in both Accounting and Health Information Services.  She has 
several years of administrative experience in private sector hospitals and, prior to this, served as an administrative 
assistant and court reporter in the U.S. Army for six years. 
 
REFERENCES 
 
1. Becker, C.L., M.L. DeFond, J. Jiambalvo, and K.R. Subramanyam, The Effect of Audit Quality on 
Earnings Management, Contemporary Accounting Research, Vol. 15, No. 1, pp. 1-24, 1998. 
2. Benford, F., The Law of Anomalous Numbers, Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, Vol. 
78, No. 4, pp. 551-572, 1938. 
3. Blokdijk, H., F. Drieenhuizen, D.A. Simunic, and M.T. Stein, An Analysis of Cross-sectional Differences 
in Big and Non-big Public Accounting Firms’ Audit Programs, Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, 
Vol. 25, No. 1, pp. 27-48, 2006. 
4. Brenner, G.A. and R. Brenner, Memory and Markets, or Why are You Paying $2.99 for a Widget, The 
Journal of Business, Vol. 55, No. 1, pp. 147-158, 1982. 
5. Carslaw, C.A.P.N., Anomalies in Income Numbers: Evidence of Goal Oriented Behavior, The Accounting 
Review, Vol. 63, No. 2, pp. 321-327, 1988. 
6. Craswell, A., J. Francis and S. Taylor, Auditor Brand Name Reputations and Industry Specializations, 
Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 20, No. 3, pp. 297-322, 1995. 
7. Das, S. and H. Zhang, Rounding-up in Reported EPS, Behavioral Thresholds, and Earnings Management, 
Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 35, No. 1, pp. 31-50, 2003. 
8. DeAngelo, L.E., Auditor Size and Audit Quality, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 
183-199, 1981. 
9. Francis, J. R. and J. Krishnan, Accounting Accruals and Auditor Reporting Conservatism, Contemporary 
Accounting Research, Vol. 16, No. 1, pp. 135-165, 1999. 
10. Francis, J.R., E.L. Maydew, and H.C. Sparks, The Role of Big 6 Auditors in the Credible Reporting of 
Accruals, Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, Vol. 18, No. 2, pp. 17-34, 1999. 
11. Francis, J.R. and D. Wang, The Joint Effect of Investor Protection and Big 4 Audits on Earnings Quality 
around the World, Contemporary Accounting Research, Vol. 25, No. 1, pp. 157-191, 2008. 
12. Geiger, M.A. and D.V. Rama, Audit Firm Size and Going-Concern Reporting Accuracy, Accounting 
Horizons, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp. 1-17, 2006. 
13. Healy, P.M. and J.M. Wahlen, A Review of the Earnings Management Literature and Its Implications for 
Standard Setting, Accounting Horizons, Vol. 13, No. 4, pp. 365-383, 1999. 
14. Huang, P., T.J. Louwers, S.S. Moffitt, and Y. Zhang, Ethical Management, Corporate Governance, and 
Abnormal Accruals, Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 83, No. 3, pp. 469-487, 2008. 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – January/February 2010 Volume 26, Number 1 
30 
15. Jordan, C.E. and S.J. Clark, Evidence on the Level of Corporate America’s Participation in the Earnings 
Game, The National Accounting Journal, Vol. 5, No. 1, pp. 61-70, 2003. 
16. Jordan, C.E., S.J. Clark, and M. Anderson, Unusual Digital Patterns in EPS: Evidence on the Association 
between Earnings Management and Company Characteristics, Journal of Business & Economics Research, 
Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 31-40, 2008a. 
17. Jordan, C.E., S.J. Clark, and G.R. Pate, Earnings Management to Achieve Cognitive Reference Points in 
Income, Academy of Accounting and Financial Studies Journal, Vol. 12, No. 3, pp. 97-112, 2008b. 
18. Khurana, I.K. and K.K. Raman, Litigation Risk and the Financial Reporting Credibility of Big 4 versus 
Non-Big 4 Audits: Evidence from Anglo-American Countries, The Accounting Review, Vol. 79, No. 2, pp. 
473-495, 2004. 
19. Kinnunen, J. and M. Koskela, Who Is Miss World in Cosmetic Earnings Management? A Crosse-national 
Comparison of Small Upward Rounding of Net Income Numbers among Eighteen Countries, Journal of 
International Accounting Research, Vol. 2 pp. 39-68, 2003. 
20. Krishnan, G.V., Audit Quality and the Pricing of Discretionary Accruals, Auditing: A Journal of Practice 
& Theory, Vol. 22, No. 1, pp. 109-126, 2003. 
21. Maijoor, S.J. and A. Vanstraelen, Earnings Management within Europe: The Effects of Member State 
Audit Environment, Audit Firm Quality, and International Capital Markets, Accounting and Business 
Research, Vol. 36, No. 1, pp. 33-52, 2006. 
22. Niskanen, J. and M. Keloharju, Earnings Cosmetics in a Tax-driven Accounting Environment: Evidence 
from Finnish Public Firms, The European Accounting Review, Vol. 9, No. 3, pp. 443-452, 2000. 
23. Payne, J.L. and S.W.G. Robb, Earnings Management: The Effect of Ex Ante Earnings Expectations, 
Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance, Vol. 15, No. 4, pp. 371-392, 2000. 
24. Piot, C. and R. Janin, External Auditors, Audit Committees and Earnings Management in France, European 
Accounting Review, Vol. 16, No. 2, pp. 429-454, 2007. 
25. Simunic, D. and M.T. Stein, The Impact of Litigation Risk on Audit Pricing: A Review of the Economics 
and Evidence, Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, Vol. 15, Supplement, pp. 119-134, 1996. 
26. Skousen, C.J., L. Guan, and T.S. Wetzel, Anomalies and Unusual Patterns in Reported Earnings: Japanese 
Managers Round Earnings, Journal of International Financial Management & Accounting, Vol. 15, No. 3, 
pp. 212-234, 2004. 
27. Thomas, J.K., Unusual Patterns in Reported Earnings, The Accounting Review, Vol. 64, No. 4, pp. 773-787, 
1989. 
28. Van Caneghem, T., Earnings Management Induced by Cognitive Reference Points, British Accounting 
Review, Vol. 34, No. 2, pp. 167-178, 2002. 
29. Van Caneghem, T., The Impact of Audit Quality on Earnings Rounding-up Behavior: Some U.K. 
Evidence, European Accounting Review, Vol. 13, No. 4, pp. 771-786, 2004. 
30. Vander Bauwhede, H. and M. Willekens, Evidence on (the lack of) Audit Quality Differentiation in the 
Private Client Segment of the Belgian Audit Market, European Accounting Review, Vol. 13, No. 3, pp. 
501-522, 2004. 
